Community Benefits Agreements:
A New Local Government Tool or Another Variation
on the Exactions Theme?
Vicki Beent
Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are the latest in a long line of tools
neighbors have used to protect their neighborhoodfrom the burdens of development,
and to try to secure benefits from the proposed development. This Article canvasses the
benefits and drawbacks various stakeholders perceive CBAs to offer or to threaten,and
reviews the legal and policy questions CBAs present. It recommends that local governments avoid the use of CBAs in land use approvalprocesses unless the CBAs are negotiated through processes designed to ensure the transparency of the negotiations, the
representativenessand accountability of the negotiators, and the legality and enforceability of the CBAs' terms.

INTRODUCTION

A community benefits agreement (CBA) results from negotiations between a developer proposing a particular land use and a coalition of community organizations that claims to represent the individuals and groups affected by the proposed development.' In a typical
CBA, community members agree to support the developer's proposed
project, or at least promise not to oppose the project or to invoke procedural devices or legal challenges that might delay or derail the
project. In return, the developer agrees to provide to the community
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such benefits as assurances of local jobs, affordable housing, and environmental improvements.2
CBAs are a relatively recent phenomenon across the United
States, although they grow out of a long history of negotiations among
developers, land use authorities and public officials, and the affected
community and various stakeholder groups (such as environmental
groups or organized labor) over development proposals that require
governmental approval.' The first major CBA, the Los Angeles Staples
Center agreement, was signed in 2001.' Since then, scores of CBAs
have been negotiated across the country.'
Because most CBAs are relatively new, there is scant evidence
(either empirical or anecdotal) to evaluate whether CBAs are a net
benefit to the parties who enter into these agreements. Similarly, little
is known about the impact CBAs have on individuals or community
groups in the neighborhood of the development that are not parties to
the agreements. Nor is it yet clear what effect CBAs will have on the
land use process or on local governments' economic development policies more generally.
Given the rising popularity of CBAs, it is important to evaluate
the benefits and drawbacks of these agreements in light of both the
experience (albeit limited) of parties who have entered into CBAs
and more theoretical concerns about the impact that CBAs may have
on the processes of land use regulation and real estate development.
Those theoretical concerns are grounded in a long history of efforts by
communities, developers, and local governments to find flexible ways
to address neighbors' concerns about development proposals. Conditional rezonings, development agreements, negotiated exactions, conditional negative declarations in environmental impact review, and
compensated siting agreements between industries needing to develop
locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) and host communities have
been used for decades.! The debates about, and experiences under,
such progenitors of CBAs offer important insights into the possible
advantages and disadvantages of CBAs.
This Article begins by briefly summarizing the structure, history,
and political and legal context of CBAs. Part II evaluates the benefits
Id at 9-10.
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and drawbacks various stakeholders perceive CBAs to offer or to
threaten. Part III surveys some of the thorny legal and policy questions presented by CBAs. Part IV argues that local governments
should avoid the use of CBAs in the land use process unless they are
subject to various constraints designed to ensure their transparency,
representativeness, legality, and enforceability.
I. OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS

A. What Are CBAs?
CBAs are agreements that detail the conditions a developer will
provide in order to secure the cooperation, or at least forbearance, of
community organizations regarding the developer's application for
permission to develop a particular project. Community opposition to a
proposed development obviously may influence whether regulatory
bodies will approve the project. Community opposition also may affect
whether government agencies are willing to help fund the project. A
developer's ability to secure community acceptance of the project
through a CBA accordingly may significantly affect the chances that the
project will make it through various regulatory and funding hurdles.
In some cases, the developer initiates discussion about a CBA; in
others, community groups approach the developer. At times, regulatory
authorities or elected officials have suggested that the parties negotiate
a CBA.
The benefits developers offer through a CBA vary with the particular development and community. Common promises include
commitments to use local residents or businesses for the labor and
material needed for the project; assurances that a certain number or
percentage of housing units will be affordable to low- or moderateincome workers; agreements to pay living wages (or other benefits) to
workers employed on the project; stipulations that the development
be designed and constructed in an environmentally friendly fashion;
and promises to correct existing environmental problems.' In return,
coalitions of community groups promise the cooperation or forbearance necessary to allow the developer to get through the government
approval processes as expeditiously as possible.
The final agreement is usually a private agreement between the
developer and a coalition of community groups or individual groups. In
a few recent cases, though, local government officials have participated
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in the negotiations' or signed the agreement as witnesses,' and in many
cases, the local government has incorporated the agreement (or its
terms) into its own development agreement with the property owner."
B.

The Rise and Spread of CBAs

While CBAs have roots in other land use tools, as described in
Part I.C, the modern CBA movement began in California. The first
CBA involved the $4.2 billion Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment
District development, which abuts the Staples Center, home of the
NBA's Los Angeles Lakers." The Staples CBA was negotiated by a
consortium of developers that already had constructed the Staples
Center itself, and the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ), a local coalition of twenty-nine community groups and
five labor unions."
The development as proposed included an entertainment plaza, a
7,000-seat theater, a 250,000-square-foot expansion of the Los Angeles
convention center, retail businesses, a housing complex, and a 45-story
hotel, supported by at least $150 million in public subsidies as well as
the use of eminent domain.I In an effort to get the project approved
before the mayor and several city council members who supported the
project reached the end of their limited terms, the developers reached
out to the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, which joined
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forces with FCCEJ to negotiate the CBA." The city encouraged the
negotiations, but did not participate directly."
After just five months of negotiations," FCCEJ agreed to support
the rezonings and public subsidies needed for the project, and the developers agreed to:
* fund an assessment of community park and recreation needs,
and commit $1 million toward meeting those needs;
* make "reasonable efforts" to maintain 70 percent of the
5,500 permanent jobs generated by the project as "living
wage" jobs;
* adopt a "first source" hiring program, giving preference to certain target groups, including individuals whose home or place
of employment was displaced by the development; low-income
individuals living within three miles of the development; and
low-income individuals from the poorest census tracts
throughout the city;
* construct 100 to 160 affordable housing units, representing approximately 20 percent of the total number of units created by
the project;
* provide $650,000 in interest-free loans to nonprofit housing
developers for the creation of additional affordable housing;
* provide funding of up to $25,000 per year for five years toward
the cost of implementing a residential permit parking program
in the neighborhoods surrounding the development;
* establish an advisory committee to monitor the implementation of the agreement and to enforce its terms."
The City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency both approved the CBA, and the agreement was
integrated into a development agreement between the developer and
the Redevelopment Agency, making it enforceable by both the city
and the community groups.
14
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15 Id at 21.
16

Id.

17

Community Benefits Program for the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District

Project A2-A11
(Strategic Actions for a Just Economy, May 29, 2001),
online at http://www.saje.net/atf/cf/%7B493B2790-DD4E-4EDO-8F4E-C78E8F3A7561 %7D/
communitybenefits.pdf (visited Nov 9,2009).
18 Greg LeRoy and Anna Purinton, Community Benefits Agreements: EnsuringThat Urban

Redevelopment Benefits Everyone 8 (Neighborhood Funders Group, Aug 2005), online at
http://www.nfg.org/publications/community-benefits-agreements.pdf (visited Nov 9,2009).

10

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:5

The perceived success of the Staples expansion agreement led to
a number of subsequent CBAs in Los Angeles, including the CBA for
the Los Angeles International Airport's (LAX) $11 billion modernization plan." The economic downturn makes it difficult to assess whether
CBAs have or will become a permanent fixture in the city's urban development process, but at the very least, they regularly are on the agenda in
public discussions about major projects involving public subsidies.2
CBAs quickly spread across California.2 1 Community groups in
Atlanta,22 Boston," Charleston,24 Chicago,n Denver,26 Milwaukee,'
Minneapolis/St. Paul," Miami,29 New Haven,"o New Orleans," Seattle,"

19 For a reprint of the SunQuest Industrial Park Community Benefits Agreement, the
NoHo Commons Community Benefits Agreement, and the Marlton Square
Community Benefits Agreement, see the Partnership for Working Families
website, online at http://www.communitybenefits.org/article.php?list=type&type=155 (visited
Nov 9, 2009). See also Community Benefits Agreement: LAX Master Plan Program 6-33
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20
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the 2016 Olympic Games. The Chicago negotiations were nullified when Rio de Janeiro
was chosen to host the Olympics. See Angela Caputo, Chicago 2016 Benefits
Agreement a "Good Start," Progress Illinois Blog (Mar 27, 2009), online at
http://www.progressillinois.com/2009/3/27/benefits-agreement-good-start (visited Nov 9, 2009)
(explaining that community activists negotiated the CBA, which would have required the development of affordable housing and jobs for the residents living near the planned 2016 Olympic
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and Washington, DC" also have begun to negotiate CBAs. Most are
tied to real estate development, and the community groups' ability to
insist on a CBA is based on their power to slow down or block required land use approvals. Some CBAs, however, are tied instead to
subsidies, franchises, or contracts that the developer wants to win from
the government, so the community groups' leverage lies in their influence over those processes.
C.

CBAs in Context: The Role of Negotiated Mitigation and Amenities in Land Use Regulation

The drafters of the first zoning ordinances and the standard state
zoning enabling act believed that once enacted, the zoning ordinance
would resolve most issues, and exceptions to the zoning would be rare.
That has not proved to be the case, for many reasons." Planners and
zoners are not omniscient, of course, and cannot write zoning ordin29
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ances that anticipate a fast-paced real estate market that must adapt
to new technology such as cell phones or new consumer fads such as
the coffee bar craze. In addition, buyers want more variety than the
cookie-cutter development that rigid zoning tends to produce, and
developers want more flexibility to address special characteristics of
the land than rigid end-state zoning allows. Regulators (and their constituents) want flexibility to adapt to evolving information about how
land development affects wildlife habitat, water quality, air quality,
services and infrastructure in neighboring areas, and a range of other
interests that are typically considered as part of an environmental review process. Further, land use regulators often see their role as mediating conflicts among the various stakeholders who have legitimate
interests in the use of the land, and that role requires flexibility."
Accordingly, zoning has moved from a set of rigid prescriptive
rules about land use to a more flexible set of standards, which allow
the specifics of the requirements imposed on each proposed development to vary with the threatened impacts of the project and the concerns of the various interest groups affected by the proposal. That
flexibility creates dangers, however, that the negotiations surrounding
land use development may be unfair to the developer or to those affected by the development, or that the negotiations may stand in the
way of a development that would increase the overall social welfare
by producing more benefits than costs.
The courts and state legislatures first responded to the advent of
"negotiated" zoning with horror." Early decisions struck down "contract" zoning, for example, when the local government conditioned
rezonings on so many particulars that the arrangement resembled a
contract." But courts eventually realized that negotiation over the
details of the land use proposal and its impacts on the surrounding
community is an entrenched feature of the land use regulation scheme
and shifted from rejecting the practice to instead minimizing the possibility that the negotiations would be unfair. While tolerating negotia37

Rose, 71 Cal L Rev at 894-900,908-10 (cited in note 36).

38

See, for example, Midtown Properties, Inc v Township of Madison, 172 A2d 40, 44 (NJ

Super Ct 1961) (recognizing that contract zoning allows the "zoning power ... [to be] prostituted
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39 Wegner, 65 NC L Rev at 982-86 (cited in note 36); Bruce R. Bailey, Comment, The Use
and Abuse of Contract Zoning, 12 UCLA L Rev 897,898-900 (1965).
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tions over local improvements that were meant to address burdens the
development will impose on the local community, courts draw lines
about what are proper "quid pro quo[s]," and have made clear that
"government may not place itself in the position of reaping a cash
premium because one of its agencies bestows a zoning benefit upon a
developer. Zoning benefits are not cash items.""
Perhaps the best example of the courts' approach is their treatment of exactions and impact fees. Exactions are conditions that a
local government imposes on a developer in return for the local government agreeing to allow a land use that it otherwise could prohibit.
Exactions are a means of ensuring that developers, rather than taxpayers, bear the costs and risks of development, use publicly funded
resources efficiently, and mitigate any harmful consequences of development." Typically, the condition is that the developer supply, or fund,
a public facility or amenity. For example, exactions may include impact
fees to defray the cost of roads or congestion management needed
because of the traffic generated by the development, or may require
land or easement dedications for the property needed to provide
schools or parks for the development.43
Initially, courts were suspicious of local governments' authority to
impose exactions and of the danger that the governments were simply
"rent-seeking," or attempting to extract some of the developer's profits in exchange for the government's approval." Eventually, however,
the courts' approach became one of managing the dangers of negotiations over exactions. 45 To ensure that governments were not simply
"extorting" developers, the Supreme Court imposed a "nexus" requirement: the benefit the government seeks to exact from a developer must have an "essential nexus" to the legitimate state interest that
the government would have invoked to justify rejecting the proposed
40 MunicipalArt Society v City of New York, 522 NYS2d 800,803-04 (NY S Ct 1987) (voiding the city's sale of a site to a developer because the developer was promised a $57 million price
reduction if the city did not provide a zoning bonus to allow for increased floor space).
41

Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constrainton Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional

Conditions Doctrine,91 Colum L Rev 473,478-83 (1991) (providing an overview of exactions).
42
Id.
43 Id.
44

See, for example, Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v Village of Mount Prospect,176 NE2d

799, 803 (Ill 1961) (finding that an ordinance requiring a landowner to dedicate part of his property for the construction of a school in exchange for receiving a permit to construct residential
units was "an unreasonable condition" and "purports to take private property for public use
without compensation"); Gulest Associates v Town of Newburgh, 209 NYS2d 729, 733 (NY S Ct

1960), affd, 15 AD2d 815 (NY App 1962) (holding an ordinance requiring that a landowner pay
for a park, playground or other recreational space to be built before the town granted permission to build on his property "permits the taking of property without due process of law and
... must therefore be declared illegal, null and void").
45 See Been, 91 Colum L Rev at 475 (cited in note 41).
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development.4 Further, the amount of the benefit the government
seeks has to be roughly proportional to the impact that the particular
development would impose.4 Within those strictures (as well as others
imposed by state law), however, governments are allowed to impose
exactions that seek benefits from developers to offset the impacts the
proposed development will have on the local community.
Similarly, the courts have recognized that local governments can
impose conditions upon developers through the environmental impact
review process. In New York, for example, a negative declaration is a
finding by the relevant government entity that a proposed development or project would have no significant effect on the environment
and therefore a full environmental impact review is not necessary.
Agencies may issue "conditional negative declarations" when they
conclude that the developer can adopt measures to mitigate any
harmful environmental impacts the proposed development might
cause.4' Indeed, developers try to avoid the need for a complete environmental impact statement (EIS) by offering mitigation measures
designed to keep the project's impacts below the threshold that would
trigger full review." Further, agencies confronted with a final EIS that
identifies environmental harm that will result from the development
may approve the development conditioned upon various measures to
mitigate the harms."
Community benefits agreements must be seen against the backdrop of these doctrines the courts (and legislatures) have adopted to
cabin negotiations over the approval of proposed land development.
Although the doctrines may not apply directly to CBAs (depending
upon how involved land use regulators are in the CBAs, and upon
how they are structured), they help to illuminate some of the dangers
CBAs pose.
46

See Nollan v CaliforniaCoastal Commission,483 US 825,837 (1987).

Dolan v City of Tigard,512 US 374,391 (1994) ("'[Rlough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment ... the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.").
48 NY Envir Conserv Law § 8-0109 (McKinney) (setting out the procedure for "preparation of environmental impact statements").
47

49 Consider Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 Colum L Rev 903, 908 (2002) (by redefining a

project's impact through backdoor incorporation of mitigation measures).
5o

See, for example, Town of Henrietta v Department of Environmental Conservation,430

NYS2d 440,445-48 (NY App 1980).
51
CBAs also should be viewed against the doctrines limiting the reach of neighborhood
consent provisions in zoning ordinances. Such provisions require developers to secure the consent of some percentage of neighboring property owners before they can develop the property.
The requirements have met with considerable skepticism, and the Supreme Court's limited
jurisprudence on neighbors' consent provisions suggests that they are unconstitutional if neigh-
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II. WHAT Do COMMUNITIES, DEVELOPERS, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS FIND ATI'RACTIVE ABOUT CBAs?
A.

Communities
1. CBAs may give neighborhoods a more meaningful role in the
development process than the opportunities the existing land
use process provides for public participation.

Those who champion CBAs on behalf of local communities articulate several justifications for the agreements. First, they argue that
the local government's normal land use procedures often fail to ensure that the concerns of the neighborhood most affected by the proposed development are considered and adequately addressed.52 They
worry as well that the representatives of the neighborhood are not
effective in advocating for the community. In New York City, for example, community boards' recommendations are advisory only and
may be ignored by the appointed planning commission or elected officials." Others in the land use approval process could disregard a community board's recommendations for appropriate reasons, such as the
City's need for a particular type of development, but also may be perceived as disregarding the community's concerns because they depend
upon developers for campaign contributions or other political support." Further, the community boards are given few resources and
little training to evaluate development proposals. Members serve at
the pleasure of the borough president, who sometimes replaces membors are able to exercise unbridled discretion, at least if the proposed use is not a noxious one.
See Seattle Title Trust Co v Roberge, 278 US 116, 120-22 (1928) (determining that an ordinance
which allows for the erection of a philanthropic home for children or the elderly only when twothirds of the nearby property owners consent violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Eubank v
City of Richmond, 226 US 137, 140-44 (1912) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by a measure allowing neighboring property owners to impose building restrictions on
adjoining lots). But see Thomas Cusack Co v City of Chicago, 242 US 526, 527-31 (1917) (holding that an ordinance allowing the placement of buildings only when written consent is obtained
from the neighboring property owners is constitutional and attempting to distinguish this holding from Eubank). See also A. Dan Tarlock, An Economic Analysis of Direct Voter Participation

in Zoning Change,1 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 31,37-41 (1980).
52
Communities in many cities have turned to CBAs out of frustration with the lack of
meaningful opportunities for communities to participate in the planning and design of federal
urban renewal projects, community economic development programs, and land use decisions
more generally. See, for example, Ho, 17 J Affordable Hous & Comm Dev L at 11-19 (cited in
note 3).
53
See New York City Charter § 2800(d). See also Community Board Assistance Unit,
Handbook for Community Board Members 23-48 (NYC Mayor's Office, 2009), online at

http://www.nyc.gov/btml/cauldownloads/pdflhandbook 2009.pdf (visited Nov 10,2009).
5
See Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 4 (cited in
note 1).
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bers whose views he or she does not like. Finally, while New York City
gives communities the power to propose their own plans, there is
widespread dissatisfaction with that process."
Similar complaints are heard in many cities and towns across the
country.6 Perhaps not surprisingly, then, neighborhoods wishing to
have a more significant role in the land use process see CBAs as a
more direct and powerful way for residents to shape their neighborhood's development.
2. CBAs give neighborhoods a role in the development process
when the local government's typical land use processes are
preempted.
Communities complain that they have even less input into the
land use approval process when their local government's normal
processes are preempted because the project involves the county,
state, or federal government or special authorities. In those situations,
the processes for approval often do not provide the local community
an opportunity to participate that the community finds satisfying."
Often, the only hearing open to the public is in the environmental impact review process, and community groups complain bitterly that the
55
See, for example, Frank Lombardi, Back off Bloomy! Rally at City Hall Rips Community
Board Cuts, NY Daily News 29 (June 10, 2009) (describing how elected officials and community
leaders protested the mayor's proposed 11 percent decrease for community board budgets);
Helen Rosenthal, Cutting Back on Democracy, Gotham Gazette (Mar 16, 2009), online at
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/fea/20090316/202/2854 (visited Nov 10, 2009) (quoting a
community board chairwoman as saying that "community boards have received no meaningful
increases in their budgets since 1980 making it impossible for them to ... keep up with rising
costs" and that budget cuts will "diminish the boards' ability to develop zoning and infrastructure plans, [ ] to analyze and conduct public review of development proposals ... [and] reduce
the boards' ability to communicate with and involve residents, businesses and institutions");

Lincoln Anderson, Stringer Wants Reform, New Blood on Community Boards, The Villager

(Feb 22, 2006), online at http://www.thevillager.com/villager_147/stringerwantsreform.html (visited Nov 10, 2009) ("[Plroblems with community boards have included vacancies left too long
unfilled, as well as a highly politicized appointment process and 'ad-hoc removals' of board
members... .Other problems ... include unreported lobbying and lax oversight and enforcement
of conflict-of-interest rulings."); Robin Shulman, Report Finds Disparity in City Aid to Communi-

ty Boards,NY Times B2 (June 20, 2005) ("A report on Manhattan community boards found that
there is a wide disparity in resources and services across the borough, and that poorer districts
sometimes receive far less city money than wealthier ones."); Derek Alger, Issue of the Week:
25,
2002),
online
at
Gazette
(Mar
Community-Based Planning, Gotham
http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/communityboards (visited Nov 10, 2009) (discussing the
problems New York City communities have encountered in trying to develop plans for their own
future development).
56 See Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreement at 3-5 (cited in
note 1).
57
New York Public Interest Research Group, Memo: ULURP Should Apply to the Atlantic
Yards Project (June 18,2004), online at http/www.developdontdestroy.org/publicnypirg-ULURP.pdf
(visited Nov 10, 2009).
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hearings are focused on the minutia of dense and technical environmental impact statements and provide little meaningful opportunity
for community members to have an impact on the project.a CBA advocates accordingly argue that CBAs especially are necessary to ensure that the community's needs are voiced and addressed when a
local government's typical land use processes do not apply."
3. CBAs give neighborhoods an opportunity to address issues, such
as wage rates or employment practices, that the local government does not typically address in the normal land use process.
Advocates of CBAs believe that CBAs give the residents affected
by a development a say regarding all the ways in which a proposal
may change the local community, without regard to whether those
impacts fit neatly within the current definition of "land use" or environmental "impacts." The normal land use process, advocates claim,
focuses on traditional land use concerns, such as the height and bulk
of a project, and accordingly does not always ensure that those most
affected by the development have a voice in shaping all the ways in
which the development could affect or benefit the community.6 CBAs
allow neighborhoods to negotiate their own mitigation and benefits
without having to worry about the Nollan -Dolan6 nexus and proportionality requirements, which might apply if the city were involved in
the negotiations.
Many CBAs, for example, address the percentage of the development's construction jobs that will be reserved for minority, women,
or local workers, as well as the wage rates of those hired for the jobs.6
Such requirements might not pass muster under Nollan-Dolan, but
advocates believe that because CBAs are private agreements, they will
not trigger the Nollan-Dolan nexus or proportionality requirements.
As discussed in Part III.D, to the extent that CBAs are required by or
incorporated into the land use approval processes, they may implicate
Nollan-Dolan,so this "advantage" of CBAs may be illusory.

58
59

Urban Renewal: Up in Arms about the Yards, Economist 33 (Sept 23,2006).
See, for example, Tom Angotti, Bronx Terminal Market and the Subverting of the Land Use

Review
Process,
Gotham
Gazette
(Dec
2005),
online
at
http/www.gothamgazette.com/article/landuse/20051213/12/1680 (visited Nov 10, 2009) (discussing the
trend for large-scale development projects to be approved outside of the normal land use process).
6o See Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 5-6 (cited in
note 1).
61
62

See Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825,837 (1987).
See Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374,391 (1994).

63

See text accompanying notes 16-18.
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4. CBAs allow neighborhoods to control the distribution of at
least some of the benefits of the development.
The normal land use process does not necessarily ensure that
those most affected by a development proposal will receive their fair
share of the benefits of the development. In many cases, one of the
direct benefits of a development is the creation of new jobs. The land
use approval process may take into account the permanent benefits
that a development will bring to a community in weighing whether to
allow the development. But the land use process generally does not
address which community, or group within the community, should get
jobs (or other benefits) the development creates.4 Proponents of
CBAs believe that they can help give community groups "a united
voice"65 that can help them secure promises that jobs (and other benefits) will be offered first to the residents of the neighborhoods in
which the development is being built.
B.

Developers
1. CBAs may garner community support for the project and therefore increase the chances that the project will be approved.

A developer's success in obtaining regulatory approvals and financial support from the government in a timely fashion is influenced, of
course, by community support for the project. Some developers therefore have accepted and even embraced the use of CBAs because they
may secure some measure of community support for, or at least reduce
opposition to, the development. Even if the developer believes the
project will be approved without a CBA, by gaining support (or reducing opposition) for the project in the community, a CBA may reduce
the risk of rejection or save the developer time in the approval process.
2. CBAs may be a more cost-effective way of sharing some of
the benefits of the development than other means used in
public approvals processes.
Developers also may embrace CBAs because they understand that
they will be asked to contribute benefits at some point in the public
process and believe that negotiating a CBA with community groups will
result in lower costs than negotiating with elected or appointed officials.
Or they may believe that promises made through CBAs are less likely
64

See Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 5-6 (cited in

note 1).
65

Ho, 17 J Affordable Hous & Comm Dev L at 9 (cited in note 3).
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to be strictly enforced (in terms of the quality of amenities constructed
or offered, for example) than if elected or appointed officials were to
require the benefits at issue. Or, developers may believe that they will
get greater public relations benefits from CBAs than from any benefits
that they provide during a public process.
3. CBAs may provide more certainty that a project will not be
challenged in court.
Even after a project has received the requisite regulatory approvals, a developer might still have to consider the likelihood that
dissatisfied community groups may sue to challenge the approvals.
Developers (and their lenders) are unlikely to expend any significant
dollars until the applicable statute of limitations has expired. A CBA
will reduce the chances of a lawsuit being filed; the more inclusive the
CBA is, the more certainty a developer will have that a project will
proceed on a timely basis.
City Officials and Local Politicians

C.

1. CBAs may allow municipalities to bypass legal constraints on
land use regulation imposed by statute and judicial precedent.
As noted above, the Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan v California Coastal Commission" and Dolan v City of Tigard preclude mu-

nicipalities from imposing exactions on proposed projects unless those
exactions have a substantial nexus to impacts of the developments that
would otherwise justify rejection of the development proposal, and unless the exaction is roughly proportional in amount to those impacts.'
The restrictions established by Nollan and Dolan, however, only constrain actions taken by the government. Thus, community groups may
be able to convince a developer that the agreement is not constrained
by Nollan or Dolan and secure concessions the courts might view as
unrelated to the development's land use impacts. To the extent that local government officials are unhappy about their inability to address
local concerns because of the strictures of Nollan and Dolan and other
legal constraints, those officials also may wish to see CBAs fill the void.
As noted above, however, and discussed more fully in Part III.D, if
CBAs are required by or incorporated into the land use approval
processes, they in fact may implicate Nollan and Dolan."
6
67
6
69

483 US 825 (1987).
512 US 374 (1994).
See text accompanying notes 46-47.
See text accompanying notes 46-47,99-105.
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2. CBAs may allow elected and appointed officials to distance
themselves from politically unpopular community demands
or from politically unpopular developments.
Local government officials may see CBAs as a way to deflect the
ire of developers to the community when the developers believe they
are being asked to contribute too many, or inappropriate, benefits in
exchange for permission to develop. A local government may wish to
appear welcoming to development in order to maintain the jurisdiction's growth, and local officials may need to secure developers' campaign contributions to support electoral campaigns, so officials may
wish to avoid being seen as overly demanding. By tacitly allowing
community groups to bargain with the developer through CBAs that
are outside of the land use process, municipalities are able to address
community needs while blaming forces outside the land use approval
process for the demands made of developers.
CBAs negotiated outside of the land use process also provide
cover for local officials who vote to approve a development that is
unpopular with their constituents. By citing the CBA, local officials
are able to point to the benefits the community will receive and therefore justify the officials' support for the development.
3. CBAs may allow local officials to secure more for their own
constituents than the public approval processes might allow.
Politicians who represent the district in which a proposed development falls may believe their constituents should get more of the
benefits of the proposed development, because those constituents are
likely to bear more of the impacts than others in the community. As
discussed in Part II.A.3, CBAs may confer benefits better tailored to
the local community's needs than concessions the developer makes in
the public approval process because CBAs may not be constrained by
the laws applicable to the public processes and because the public approval process involves many other constituencies that must be satisfied.'o Local politicians accordingly may see the CBA process as a way
for them to "deliver" benefits specific to their communities that is easier for them to use than the normal land use processes."

70

note 1).
71

Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 10 (cited in
Salkin and Lavine, 26 UCLA J Envir L & Pol at 292 (cited in note 11).
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III. THE LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES POSED BY

CBAs

Many participants in the land use process have expressed concern
about the unregulated nature of the CBA negotiations process. Because CBAs are a recent phenomenon, the concerns summarized in
this Part are not based on empirical studies of the agreements or their
implementation, but instead are based on observations about CBAs
currently in operation and on the history of negotiations over land use
approvals among city officials, developers, and members of the host
community described in Part II.C. This Part draws upon several New
York City CBAs to illustrate various points, but examples could be
drawn from many jurisdictions around the country.
A. Will "Community" Groups Involved in CBAs Represent the
Community?
One of the most common criticisms leveled at CBAs is that the
agreements may not represent the wishes of the majority of the community. Under New York City's Uniform Land Use Review Process
(ULURP), for example, community boards, borough presidents, the
City Planning Commission (CPC), the city council, and the mayor all
are involved in the decision whether to grant or deny development
approval.n The borough president, city council members, and the
mayor are elected every four years. Members of community boards
officials (borough presidents
and the CPC are appointed by elected
73
appoint community board members, and the mayor, borough presidents, and the public advocate appoint the members of the CPC).
Thus, the actions of all those involved in ULURP are subject to the
political process: communities affected by development can express
support for, or opposition to, the land use decisions made by elected
officials and their appointees at the ballot box, and those officials and
appointees are accountable to the electorate.
On the other hand, in most cases, the people who negotiate CBAs
are neither elected nor appointed by the community or its elected representatives." In those instances, community members have no way of

72

The

NYC Rules, title 62, ch 2. See generally, New York City Department of City Planning,
Uniform

Land

Use

Review

Procedure

(ULURP),

online

at

http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (visited Nov 10, 2009).
73
New York City Charter §2800(a)(1). The borough president must fill at least half of the
seats with nominees from the council members representing the community district.
74 New York City Charter § 192(a).
75 See Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 11 (cited in
note 1) ("CBAs are negotiated between leaders of community groups and the developer," but
noting that government agencies and staff may play a role in negotiations, especially "[i]n un-
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holding the negotiators accountable for the conduct or outcome of the
negotiations. Negotiators who are not well organized, who are weak or
unskilled bargainers, or who do not represent the community's interests can dominate the negotiations unchecked. Further, the lack of
accountability may allow developers to choose to work with or appease some groups and ignore others.
CBA negotiations are not subject to requirements and procedures designed to ensure access to the policymaking process for all
affected constituencies. For example, New York City's ULURP specifically provides for two public hearings, first before the affected community board" and then before the City Planning Commission." Legal
rules govern the notice that must be provided to the affected communities to inform them of these hearings." CBAs, on the other hand,
may be negotiated privately, and the parties to the CBA may not give
other affected interests either notice or an opportunity to be heard
about the terms of the CBA." CBAs are rarely (if ever) put to a vote
of the community as a whole. Indeed, some of the CBAs negotiated in
New York City in recent years were not even publicly available until
just recently.8
The Atlantic Yards CBA in New York City is illustrative of the
problem. In December 2003, Forest City Ratner (FCR) announced
plans to construct a 19,000-seat arena for the NBA's New Jersey Nets,
along with housing, office and retail space, a hotel, and a parking garage, in Atlantic Yards in downtown Brooklyn. The twenty-one acre
development would be the largest development in New York City outside of Manhattan in a quarter century." Not surprisingly, the FCR
proposal generated immediate skepticism and controversy. FCR embarked on a campaign to win support for the project, and as part of
usual circumstances, [when] a government entity may in fact be the 'developer' of a project ...
[and therefore] be central to the negotiations and a party to the CBA.").
76 NYC Rules, title 62, § 2-03(a)(1).
77 NYC Rules, title 62, § 2-06(a).
78 NYC Rules, title 62, § 2-02(a)(2).
79 Some, perhaps most, of the community groups negotiating CBAs, however, have tried to
maintain transparency regarding their negotiation process and the substance of those negotiations. See, for example, Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 22
(cited in note 1).
8
Some of the CBAs negotiated in New York City have not been made readily accessible
to the public. If they are kept in the files of government agencies as part of the review process,
they may be subject to state freedom of information laws. See Washington Post Co v New York
State Insurance Department, 463 NE2d 604, 606 (NY 1984) (holding that under the plain text of
the state's Freedom of Information Law, the term public records includes any "information kept,
held, filed, produced ... by, with or for an agency"). Other states allow access to records only
when the records "have some relation to the official duties of the public officer that holds the
record." Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v Rogers, 815 P2d 900,907 (Ariz 1991).
81 Charles V.Bagli, Deal Is Signed for NetsArena in Brooklyn, NY Times Al (Mar 4,2005).
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that campaign, raised the idea of a community benefits agreement.
FCR convened a meeting of community groups, including the New
York chapter of Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN), Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development
(BUILD), the Downtown Brooklyn Advisory and Oversight Committee (DBAOC), as well as members of the community boards" in whose
jurisdictions the land fell. These groups began meeting regularly with
FCR." Other groups that had come out against the arena, such as Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn and Prospect Heights Action Coalition,
did not participate in the discussions," although there is disagreement
about whether they were excluded or refused to participate.
Within months, eight community organizations signed the Atlantic Yards CBA, while more than fifty community groups aligned in
opposition." Many interested observers have expressed concern that
the signatory groups are not representative of the impacted constituencies. Lance Freeman, an assistant professor of Urban Planning at
Columbia University, for example, criticized the Atlantic Yards CBA
on the grounds that "there is no mechanism to insure that the 'community' in a CBA is representative of the community.""
82 Some have criticized members of the community boards who negotiated with FCR,
arguing that their participation granted FCR's negotiations an appearance of greater legitimacy.
See Hugh Son, Owner Neglecting Nets, Say Critics, NY Daily News 1 (Nov 29, 2004) ("Several
community board members have protested their leadership's involvement in talks with Forest
City Ratner to secure neighborhood benefits, a move some view as lending support to the controversial project.").
83

Mafruza Khan and Brad Lander, eds, Slam Dunk orAirball?A PreliminaryPlanningAnalysis

of the Brooklyn Atlantic Yards Project 14 (Pratt Institute Center for Community and Economic Development, Mar 2005), online at http://dddb.net/documents/whitepapers/PICCED/bay-report.pdf (visited
Nov 10, 2009).
8
See id at 16; Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn, About the Ratner Plan: What is Bruce
Ratner's

'Atlantic

Yards"

Proposal?

(June

11,

2009),

online

at

http://www.dddb.net/php/aboutratner.php (visited Nov 10, 2009); Bagli, Deal Is Signed for Nets
Arena, NY Times at Al (cited in note 81) (quoting the leader of the Prospect Heights Action
Coalition, who explained the group's view that the "project is too big," would amount "to supersiz[ing] Brooklyn[,]" and would result in "1,000 people [] los[ing] their jobs or homes because of
the project").
85
See Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn, Organizations That Are Opposed to or Deeply
Concerned about the Proposed Forest City Ratner Nets Arena, 16 Highrise Tower Proposalfor

Brooklyn (2009), online at http://www.dddb.net/php/opposition.php (visited Nov 10, 2009); Nicholas Confessore, The People Speak (Shout, Actually) on Brooklyn Area Project,NY Times B1

(Oct 19,2005).
86 Lance Freeman, Atlantic Yards and the Perilsof Community Benefit Agreements, Planetizen
Contributor Blog (May 7, 2007), online at https://www.planetizen.com/node/24335 (visited Nov 10,
2009) (criticizing the Atlantic Yards CBA). See also New York City Council Committee on Economic Development, Public Hearing on the Proposed Brooklyn Atlantic Yards Project (May 6,
2005) (comments of Bettina Damiani, Project Director, Good Jobs New York) ("Damiani Comments"), online at http://www.goodjobsny.org/testimony-bay_5_05.htm (visited Nov 10, 2009) ("The
BAY project has so far demonstrated one of the major weaknesses of CBAs-in terms of 'community' input, they are only as broadly representative as the groups that negotiate them.").
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The problem of representativeness is compounded by the taint of
conflict of interest. The cooperation of at least one community group
that signed the Atlantic Yards CBA, BUILD, followed closely behind
FCR's financial contribution to the organization." Indeed, BUILD
was not incorporated until days before it announced its support for
the development." Shortly after the CBA was signed, FCR gave
BUILD $100,000, provided space and overhead for a BUILD office in
the vicinity of Atlantic Yards, and donated computer equipment and
furniture to the group." FCR has since given BUILD additional funds
and has provided funds for other signatories."0
Many groups negotiating CBAs have taken care to involve the
community, protect against conflicts of interest, and insure an inclusive
bargaining process. But there are no safeguards in place other than
those the groups impose upon themselves: no mechanism for ensuring
that those who claim to speak for the community actually do so; no
guaranteed forum through which the community can express its views
about the substance of the CBA or the wisdom of entering into a CBA;
and no formal means by which the community can hold negotiators
accountable for the success or failure of a CBA. These gaps give rise to
a fear that developers will use CBAs as part of a divide and conquer
strategy to "buy" off a few community activists in order to create the
impression of broader community support than actually exists.1
B.

Will Those Who Negotiate for the Community Drive an Appropriate Bargain?

Even if those at the bargaining table do indeed speak for the
community, there is no guarantee that they will secure a good bargain.' Representatives of the community may be hampered by inexJuan Gonzalez, BUILD Admits Ratner Funding, NY Daily News 22 (Oct 18,2005).
88 Matthew Schuerman, Ratner Sends Gehry to Drawing Board, NY Observer 13 (Dec 5,
2005) (reporting that only two of the eight groups that signed the Atlantic Yards CBA were
incorporated prior to the negotiations).
8

89

Nicholas Confessore, To Build Arena in Brooklyn, Developer First Builds Bridges, NY

Times Al (Oct 14,2005).
9 Matthew Schuerman, Out of the Woods?, NY Observer (Oct 19, 2005), online at
http://www.observer.com/node/33929 (visited Nov 10, 2009). See also Matthew Schuermann,
Ratner's Gift, NY Observer (June 9,2006), online at http://www.observer.com/node/34828 (visited
Nov 10, 2009).
91 Amy Lavine, Atlantic Yards CBA, Community Benefits Agreements Blog (Jan 29, 2008),
online at http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/01/atlantic-yards-cba.html (visited Nov 10,
2009). See also Freeman, Atlantic Yards (cited in note 86); Kenneth Fisher, Complex Policy
Choices in Managing Growth, 237 NY L J S8 (Jan 16,2007).
9
Damiani Comments (cited in note 86); Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits

Agreements at 22-23 (cited in note 1). For evidence of how communities fared in similar negotiations
over undesirable land uses, see Been, 21 Fordham Urban L J at 811-22 (cited in note 3).
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perience in negotiating with developers who have made a life's work
out of hard bargaining. Community representatives may lack the resources to ascertain what would be the best terms for the community.
The terms of CBAs are not always made public, so it is difficult for the
bargainers to assess what is an appropriate agreement.9 Further, negotiators likely are members of community groups who stand to benefit
from the terms of the CBA (even if not from direct contributions from
the developer") and therefore may have conflicts of interest in assessing what the community should ask for.
The benefits obtained also are not always easy to value. Negotiations sometimes requires valuation of parkland, trees, parking spaces, and
other amenities that are being lost to the development, and a comparison
of the value of those amenities to the value of substitutes. Such valuations
and comparisons are notoriously problematic and controversial.9
C.

Will Negotiations over a CBA Result in Neighborhood-byNeighborhood Solutions to Problems That Would Better Be Addressed on a Citywide Basis, or Otherwise Harm the Interests of
the Local Government as a Whole?

The terms of a CBA very well may affect negotiations between
the developer and elected or appointed officials in the public approval
process, depending upon how the timing of the CBA negotiations relates to the land use process. The community negotiating the CBA
may capture benefits that would have gone instead to the broader
community if CBAs were not allowed. Or the community may bargain
for one type of benefit and thereby reduce the ability of elected officials in the public approval process to get a different kind of benefit
that would have been more appropriate for the city as a whole.
Further, while the benefits incorporated into CBAs may address
important needs, such as affordable housing, critics contend that these
issues should be confronted citywide, rather than on a neighborhoodby-neighborhood basis." A citywide approach would be more likely to

9
See Been, 21 Fordham Urban L J at 825-26 (cited in note 3) (discussing how confidentiality agreements over compensated siting agreements hampered communities bargaining over
such agreements).
9
See text accompanying notes 87-90.
95 See, for example, Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality:

How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 55-129 (Oxford

2008) (discussing various theoretical challenges to accurate measurement of benefits); Eduardo
M. Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 Cornell L Rev 821, 846-53 (2009) (discussing cost-benefit analysis
in the context of land valuation).
9
Damiani Comments (cited in note 86) ("Community residents who have not been part of
the negotiation, but have expressed concerns about [negotiated benefits] ... have not had a way to
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channel resources into the neighborhoods that need them most, which
may not be the neighborhoods that happen to be getting development.
Indeed, it may often be the case that the neighborhoods in which developments are proposed are among the least needy of a local government's communities.
A jurisdiction-wide approach to the local government's needs is
likely to be more comprehensive, better planned, and better integrated with the local government's other initiatives. The Atlantic
Yards CBA, for example, promises to provide affordable housing but
envisions that the housing will draw upon various public subsidy programs.w Those public subsidies are limited resources, and the provision
of affordable housing of a particular type and in a particular neighborhood pursuant to a CBA may distort local, state, or federal government priorities for spending those resources. The subsidies might
go much further if used for other developments, but local government
officials understandably might be reluctant to refuse to subsidize affordable housing promised in a particular CBA and thereby risk having to take "blame" for the development's failure to provide community benefits."
Diversion of benefits from the local government as a whole to
the host neighborhood also may result in greater inequality among
the local government's neighborhoods. Many neighborhoods within
a local government will not be zoned for major development or will
not have the infrastructure or underused land required for such development. Those communities may share in any benefits of development that are obtained in the public approval process. If CBAs
divert benefits from the local government as a whole, however, those
include these concerns in the negotiation process .... [W]ithout broad, cross-cutting organizing,
such'CBAs' can become a mechanism for dividing the community rather than uniting it.").
9
See Atlantic Yards Development Co, Community Benefits Agreement at §VI(B)(2)(b)
(cited in note 9) (relying on "governmental contributions for site development and affordable
housing subsidies"); id at exhibit D, annex A:
[Tihe ACORN/ATLANTIC YARDS 50/50 Program will utilize existing Housing Development Corporation (HDC) bond programs and Department of Housing Preservation and
Development (HPD) programs, with necessary modifications. The program may also utilize
existing Housing Finance Agency (HFA), Affordable Housing Corporation (AHC) or
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs, with necessary modifications.
98 It is telling that those charged with administering New York City's affordable housing
programs, such as the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development, were silent about
the city's willingness to provide the subsidies that the Atlantic Yards CBA anticipated would
enable the developer to provide the affordable housing "promised" in the agreement. See generally New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg,
Forest City Ratner CEO and President Bruce
Leaders
Sign
Community
Benefits
Agreement
(June
27,

Rarner
2005),

and Civic
online
at

http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpdlhtml/pr2005/mayors-release248-05-pr.shtml (visited Nov 18,2008).
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neighborhoods may see little of the benefits from the local government's growth.
D. Will CBAs Considered in the Land Use Process Trigger Nollan and
Dolan and Other Legal Limits on Exactions-Are They Legal?
As noted in Part I.C, the Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan
and Dolan imposed nexus and proportionality requirements on local
governments' demands for exactions in the land use approval process,
at least where those exactions are negotiated on a case-by-case basis.9
The state courts have imposed additional restrictions on the use of
exactions." While the courts do not seem to have been confronted yet
with a claim that CBAs trigger those same restrictions, such a claim
would have at least a reasonable basis in the law in some circumstances. If the "leverage" community groups have to convince developers to enter into negotiations stems from an explicit or implicit requirement that the landowner enter into a CBA before seeking government approval of the land use proposal, the courts may view the
negotiations as posing no less (and perhaps more) risk of "extortion,"
to use the Nollan Court's term,o' than the local government's
processes at issue in that case. Government officials reportedly sometimes have suggested the need for the agreements,10 and indeed, even
3 Further, the agreements ofhave been involved in the negotiations.'o
ten have been reached and announced at the eleventh hour before
crucial government votes on the land use proposals.'4 Courts therefore
99 For a discussion of whether, and how, Nollan and Dolan apply to takings challenges
brought against development impact fees, see Michael B. Kent, Jr, Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev *37-50
(forthcoming 2010), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1456371 (visited Oct 29, 2009) (proposing a hybrid test combining Nollan and Dolan with standard nonexaction takings claim analysis and then applying this test to three hypothetical fact patterns).
t00 Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 Hastings L J 729,762-63 (2007). See also Andrea B. Pace, Note, Utah Leads
the Way in Regulating Land Use Exactions through Statute but Still Has Room to Improve, 21
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part of his property as a condition of granting a permit to build a house as "an out-and-out plan
of extortion").
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Kingsbridge Benefits, NY Daily News 72 (Apr 25,2008).
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(visited
Nov 10, 2009).
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may find sufficient government involvement in the negotiations themselves to trigger the legal restrictions that apply to the government. To
the extent that there are formal or informal "requirements" that developers enter into CBAs prior to seeking government approval of
their land use plans, the courts' prohibitions on neighborhood consent
requirements also may be applicable.'08 Finally, to the extent that
elected officials suggest that administrative agencies such as the local
planning commission should not approve proposals unless the developer has entered into a CBA, as some are reported to do, courts may
find that the elected official's participation in any subsequent council
vote on the agency's decision creates an appearance of bias.'1
The purpose of this Article is not to answer those questions definitively.The questions are sufficiently well grounded, however, to raise
considerable concern about the legality of CBAs.
E.

Will CBAs, Even if "Legal," Compromise Sound Planning and
Land Use Regulation?

In Nollan, the Supreme Court cautioned that the use of land use
exactions could paradoxically lead to underenforcement of the jurisdiction's land use regulations.'nThe Court suggested that a municipality that enacts strict regulations but waives those regulations in exchange for the benefits secured by exactions might achieve fewer of its
genuine land use objectives than if it enacted a less strict but nonwaivable regime.' In similar fashion, in local governments whose
http//www.columbia.edulcu/news/07/12/agreement.html (visited Nov 10, 2009); Scott M. Stringer, BP
StringerAnnounces Agreement with Columbia University to Protectand Enhance West Harlem Comat
munity as Part of Columbia Expansion Proposal (Sept 26, 2007), online

(vihttp://neighbors.columbia.edu/pages/manplanning/pdf-files/Stringer%20AnncPrposl%20SP.pdf
sited Nov 10, 2009) (announcing the Manhattan borough president's support for Columbia University
expansion and that Columbia agrees to provide specific benefits to the neighboring area).
105 See, for example, Seattle Title Trust Co v Roberge, 278 US 116, 120-22 (1928) (holding
that an ordinance requiring the consent of neighboring property owners before a building permit
would be issued violated the Due Process Clause by delegating authority over permits from the
government to local landowners); Thomas Cusack Co v City of Chicago, 242 US 526, 527-31

(1917) (holding to be constitutional an ordinance restricting the erection of billboards but providing for an exception if one-half of the neighboring property owners choose to lift the restriction because the restriction was imposed by the government rather than the neighbors); Eubank
v City of Richmond, 226 US 137, 140-44 (1912) (holding that an ordinance allowing two-thirds of
the property owners on a street to regulate how other owners could use their property on that
street, without any standards or government oversight, violated the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses).
106 See generally, for example, Prin v Council of Municipality of Monroeville, 645 A2d 450
(Pa Commw Ct 1994) (holding that a councilman's appearance before an administrative body to
oppose property development plan should have precluded him from participating in the council's vote on the applications).
10 483 US at 837 n 5.
1os Id.
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neighborhoods become dependent on the benefits conveyed by CBAs,
both the local government and community groups may lose sight of
larger, long-term land use objectives and "sell" development approval
too cheaply, leaving the community insufficiently protected from the
harms that urban developments may impose.
Indeed, critics of various projects that involved CBAs assert that
the existence of the CBA led land use officials to approve developments that otherwise might not have been approved, at least without
significant modification."9 Opponents point to provisions such as the
Atlantic Yards CBA's provision of sports tickets and decry those benefits as essentially "buying" support.no
F.

Will CBAs Chill Appropriate Development?

In some instances, a community's insistence that the developer
enter into a CBA to provide benefits to the community may deter
development that the neighborhood or the local government as a
whole actually might prefer to have." Negotiators must exercise
judgment about how hard to push for benefits, and such judgments
require negotiating experience, information about competitor cities,
analysis of market trends, and other forms of expertise that community groups bargaining over a CBA may not have.
G. Will CBAs Be Difficult to Enforce Legally, or Will They Contain
Terms That Would Be Time-Consuming and Costly to Monitor or
That Are Too Vague to Be Enforced?
Monitoring and enforcing promises made to host communities
pose significant challenges for those communities.H2 In some cases,
CBAs are phrased in aspirational terms that make it hard to determine exactly what is being promised. In the Atlantic Yards CBA, for
example, the developer's commitments often are phrased in terms,
such as "the developers agree to work ... towards the creation of a

[h]igh [s]chool""3 or the developers "will seek to""4 and "intend" to do
various things but do not actually commit the developers to do those

109 Confessore, The People Speak, NY Times at Al (cited in note 89).
110 Terry Pristin, In Major Projects,Agreeing Not to Disagree,NY Times C6 (June 14,2006);
BUILD: Bribe Us in Large Denominations, noLandGrab Blog (Sept 29, 2005), online at

http://www.nolandgrab.org/archives/2005/09/nolandgrab-comml.html (visited Nov 10, 2009).
111 Salkin, UnderstandingCommunity Benefits Agreements at 1423 (cited in note 11).
112 Salkin and Lavine, 26 UCLA J Envir L & Pol at 324 (cited in note 11); Gross, LeRoy,
and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 69-72 (cited in note 1).
113 Atlantic Yards Development Co, Community Benefits Agreement at 16 (cited in note 9).
114 Id at 17.
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things."' Other provisions defer specifics, noting, for example, that
FCR will provide space for a community health center "at rent and
terms to be agreed upon.""6 Further, some promises are subject to liquidated damages clauses-FCR can "buy-out" its obligation to provide a pre-apprentice training program, for example, by making a onetime payment of $500,000 to the community coalition."
Some CBAs do not include terms such as the timeframe for
commitments to be fulfilled, who will monitor performance, how and
when information on performance will be made available, and what
will happen if the commitment is not fulfilled." In other instances,
community groups may have lacked the legal expertise to negotiate
usable enforcement provisions."' Even when monitoring and enforcement terms are included in CBAs, tracking benefits more complex
than one-time financial payments, such as living wage and local hiring
requirements, presents practical administrative challenges.'o Finally,
because there oftentimes remains mutual skepticism between community groups and developers, monitoring may be especially costly.
Community groups may be reluctant to rely on a developer's reports,
for example, and attempt to verify figures independently."' Such independent analysis could be burdensome for a number of reasons, including the fact that the relevant information may be contained in a
developer's private records of wages and hiring decisions.'
Finally, while CBAs may meet the legal requirements for contracts, the remedies for a breach of the contract are unclear.2 There
are no federal or state cases yet squarely addressing legal issues involving the enforcement of CBAs. Numerous problems arise: if the
public approval process was influenced by the existence of a CBA, for
example, and the developer later breaches the CBA, should the reme-
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dy for the community be revocation of any approvals given in the
public process?n
In a small percentage of cases, CBAs are folded into a development agreement, and in these instances local governments assume
monitoring and enforcement responsibilities.'m Usually, however,
community groups are on their own to ensure that the promises contained in the agreement are kept.'

IV. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR CBAs
Many local governments have been inconsistent in their stance on
CBAs. During the heated real estate boom of the early 2000s, some local governments suggested (or even informally required) that developers negotiate CBAs with communities in order to gain support for ambitious projects. At the same time, concerns that CBAs are tantamount
to "zoning for sale" and may run afoul of the Nollan-Dolan "essential
nexus" test have led many local governments to be wary of appearing to
approve or be involved in the agreements. The result is considerable
confusion about how local governments will respond to CBAs.
Local governments basically have three broad options. First, they
can announce that they will not consider CBAs in the land use
process, will give no "credit" to developers for benefits they have provided through CBAs, and will play no role in monitoring or enforcing
the agreements. Second, they can agree to consider CBAs, but only if
the agreement and the process by which it was negotiated meets certain standards. Third, they can agree to consider CBAs (with the standards specified) only in decisions relating to subsidies that the local
government is providing to the proposed development.
A. Refusing to Consider CBAs in the Land Use Approval Process
Local governments may announce that consideration of CBAs in
the land use process is inappropriate and that all elected or appointed
officials with a role in the land use approval process are prohibited
from suggesting that developers seeking land use approvals enter into
CBAs, participating in discussions between developers and communi125 See Nolan M. Kennedy, Jr, Note, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning
Flexibility, 23 Hastings L J 825, 836-37 (1972). Consider City of Knoxville v Ambrister, 263 SW2d

528,530-31 (Tenn 1953) (holding that a developer's promise to dedicate land for use as a park in
exchange for an amendment to the city zoning ordinance was illegal and would not be enforced).
126 Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 10 (cited in
note 1); Salkin, Understanding Community Benefit Agreements at 1409 (cited in note 11).
127 Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 70-71 (cited in

note 1) (recognizing that it is difficult for local governments to monitor and enforce CBAs that
have not been incorporated into development agreements).
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ty groups about CBAs, or considering the existence of a CBA or the
specific terms of the CBA in deciding whether to approve a developer's request for a map or text amendment, special permit, variance, or
other discretionary land use approval. The ban would have to extend
to environmental review processes: local governments would need to
refuse to take into account the terms of any CBAs in assessing the
impact of the proposed project (unless those terms are incorporated
in the development agreement between the developer and the local
government, and otherwise meet the requirements for environmental
mitigation measures).
To ensure that the existence or terms of CBAs are not considered
inappropriately, local governments should require developers seeking
any discretionary approval (such as rezonings, variances, and special
permits) to report, in their application, any agreements negotiated
with individuals or community groups and to make public the terms of
those agreements before the final public hearing on the proposal.
B.

Considering CBAs in the Land Use Process if the CBA and the
Processes by Which It Was Negotiated Meet Certain Standards

A local government may decide that CBAs are inexorable or that
they are helpful adjuncts to the land use process. The dangers outlined
above suggest, however, that local governments considering CBAs in
the land use process should impose safeguards that address the following issues:
1. Nexus to land use concerns.
Local governments should allow consideration in the land use
process only of those CBAs (or portions of a CBA) that impose requirements that seek to directly address impacts the development will
impose on the local community that fall within the jurisdiction of land
use authorities. Agreements (or provisions of agreements) that address matters falling outside the local government's land use authority
(as living wage requirements or union labor requirements might)
should not be allowed to influence the land use review process.
2. Transparency.
Local governments should require developers seeking any discretionary approval to report, in their application, any agreements
negotiated with individuals or community groups, and to make public the terms of those agreements, before the final public hearing on
the proposal.
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3. Representativeness.
Local governments should consider only those CBAs that are negotiated by groups selected through a transparent process that opens
the negotiations to as many community groups as possible, ensures
that the developer is not "cherry picking" the groups the developer
thinks will be easiest to negotiate with, and provides some check on
the legitimacy of a group's claims to represent the neighborhood. At
the same time, the process for ensuring that negotiators are representative of the community must not enable elected or appointed officials
to "pack" the negotiations with groups favorable to the officials'
stance on the proposed development.
4. Accountability.
It is difficult to make those who negotiate CBAs accountable to the
community because they are not elected. Should a local government decide to allow CBAs to be considered in the land use process, it should
consider whether the elected officials closest to the community should be
required to approve any community benefit agreements that will be taken into account. Of course, local governments should conduct a thorough
analysis of the implications of having such elected officials "approve" the
agreement. That analysis should consider whether such participation
would trigger Nollan and Dolan in circumstances that otherwise would
not implicate those restrictions, implicate conflict of interest restrictions,
or trigger requirements for public hearings.
5. Ensuring that citywide interests are not compromised.
As discussed in Part III, CBAs may compromise the interests of
the local government as a whole in several ways: by diverting resources that the local government might otherwise have received from
the developer and chosen to spend in other neighborhoods or on other issues; by making it more likely that the local government will approve development that is inappropriate; and by committing the local
government's own resources to projects that the it might not have prioritized absent the CBA. To limit the ability of CBAs negotiated as
part of the subsidy process to have such effects, the relevant agencies
should be required to certify that they have reviewed any promises in
a CBA that implicate the local government's resources or are based
upon assumptions about government subsidies, and to reveal whether
they plan to devote the resources required for the project pursuant to
a citywide plan to address the need at issue.
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6. Ensuring enforceability of the agreement.
To address the difficulty community groups may have enforcing
the CBA, the local government should require that the terms of any
CBA be made part of the development agreement (or similar codification of promises) between the local government and the developer.
Inclusion of the terms in a development agreement or other official
agreement would allow the local government to enforce those terms
without precluding the ability of community groups to enforce the
CBA as well.
C.

CBAs in the Land Use Regulatory Process versus CBAs in the
Economic Development Practices

In many local governments, the agency charged with economic
development provides various incentives for developers to encourage
projects the local government believes will benefit the jurisdiction.
Some such agencies have required or encouraged developers receiving those subsidies to enter into CBAs with the host community.
CBAs negotiated as a condition for the receipt of government subsidies raise very different issues from the CBAs negotiated as part of
the process of land use review. When a local government chooses to
provide subsidies to developers, it is free to condition those subsidies
in any way it thinks appropriate (subject to general prohibitions on
discrimination, corruption, and so on). Developers who object to the
conditions imposed are free to decline to be involved in the project.
Those who do seek subsidies from the public must take the bitter with
the sweet; if they do not like the conditions, they can simply forego the
subsidies (or seek to convince the government that it cannot accomplish its economic development goals if it conditions the subsidies).
The difficulty, however, is that land use processes and economic
development processes often are not so easily separated. Subsidies
provided for economic development often include transfers of a local
government's land or the use of eminent domain to assemble land,
and will almost always involve a rezoning or other land use approval.
Accordingly, if CBAs are used in the economic development process,
safeguards must be in place to ensure that their influence in the land
use process is appropriate.
If a local government refuses to recognize CBAs in the land use
process, it may nevertheless decide that CBAs are appropriate considerations in its decisions to grant subsidies or contracts to developers
through the economic development process. In that case, the local
government should make clear that, to the extent possible, the CBA
will be considered only in the decision whether and to whom to award
the subsidy, not in any decisions relating to land use approvals for spe-
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cific projects. It also should impose the safeguards discussed above on
the CBAs negotiated as part of the subsidy process.
If a local government instead recognizes CBAs in the land use
process, it should apply the same safeguards to CBAs negotiated as a
requirement for subsidies that it applies to those considered in the
land use process.
CONCLUSION

CBAs are the latest in a series of tools that local governments
and community groups have used to try to ensure that development
pays its way, mitigates the harms it causes, and provides benefits to the
communities it burdens. The goal is appropriate, but the history of
such tools shows that negotiations between developers on the one
hand, and either land use officials or community groups on the other,
may lead to real or perceived conflicts of interest, compromise land
use approval processes, and foster rent-seeking. CBAs accordingly
must be carefully circumscribed. While they may be appropriate conditions to impose upon developers in return for economic development subsidies, local governments should reject any consideration of
CBAs in the land use approval process or recognize only those CBAs
that meet both substantive and procedural standards designed to limit
their potential threats. Where the economic development process and
the land use process will be inextricably intertwined, such that it will
be difficult to ensure that a CBA negotiated in exchange for economic
development subsidies has not infected the land use process, the local
government again should put into place safeguards that will limit the
dangers the CBAs pose.
The advent of CBAs is an important signal that neighborhoods
do not believe that current land use processes are adequately protecting their interests. Local governments pressured to allow CBAs, therefore, should take the opportunity provided by the economic downturn
to thoughtfully consider that dissatisfaction and to refine their land
use approval processes to ensure a more effective and satisfying role
for community input early in the approval process.
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